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ABSTRACT
The Board of Directors in a firm performs the primary role of internal control mechanism. This Study seeks to understand 
the relationship between internal governance and performance of banks in India. The research paper investigates the 
effect of board characteristics (proportion of independent directors, gender diversity, board size, meetings per year 
and attendance in board meetings) on the firm performance. This paper evaluates the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on bank’s financial performance using panel data for 28 listed banks at National Stock Exchange of India 
for the period of 2008-2014. Returns on Asset, Return on Equity, Tobin’s Q and Net Interest Income were used as the 
financial performance indicators. To estimate the relationship among governance and bank performance initially the 
Study uses Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Estimation and Generalized Least square (GLS) Estimation. Then a well-
developed Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimator is used to investigate the dynamic nature of performance 
and governance relationship. The Study empirically confirms that two step system GMM approach controls the problem of 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity as compared to the OLS and GLS approach. The result suggests that banks with 
small board, boards with female members, and boards that meet more frequently tend to be more efficient and subsequently 
have a positive impact on performance of banks. The study offers insights to policy makers interested in enhancing the 
quality of governance of banks in India. In addition, the findings suggest that board characteristics play a vital role in 
the improvement of corporate governance mechanism for financial institutions. There is a great need to have efficient 
boards in banks to improve the overall health of the financial institutions and the economic development of the country.
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INTRODUCTION
The Asian financial crisis has enhanced the inspection 
of board governance in banks worldwide. The role of 
regulatory bodies and government, the board, and the 
credit agencies have been questioned in ensuring good 
corporate governance. Following the globalization, cut 
throat competition, the need for sustainable development, 
etc., are the challenges before the corporate sectors, which 
are turbulent and unpredictable today. These challenges 
have put a lot of pressure on the corporate sector for better 
corporate governance. Better governance requires a high 
degree of professionalism, the vigilant role of directors, 
transparency in operations and disclosures, fairness in 
accounting and reporting, and fixing accountabilities, etc.
In recent year’s corporate governance has been a 
contentious issue as many initiatives have been proposed 
by advanced and developing countries for e.g. Mandatory 
Codes of Governance, Disclosure Norms, listing 
agreements etc. In 1998, The Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued its leading 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which are 
trend setters worldwide as the Code of Best Practices 
and are associated with Cadbury Report (1992). A wide 
range of literature has determined that a certain type of 
board structure is preferred to monitor managers (Pathan 
& Skully 2010). The issue was further emphasized by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), (2006) 
which set out its definition as per banking perspective, 
i.e. ‘‘corporate governance involves the manner in 
which the business and affairs of individual institutions 
are governed by their Boards of Directors and senior 
management, which affects how banks: set corporate 
objectives (including generating returns to owners); run 
day-to-day operations of the business; meet the obligation 
of accountability to their shareholders and take into 
account the interests of other recognized stakeholders. 
Thus, BCBS has proposed that corporate governance of 
financial institutions require further studying, developing 
and understanding. 
 The banking industry has been the backbone of the 
Indian economy. They enable finance for commercial 
enterprises, various financial services to the general 
public and access to payment system. They act as an 
intermediary between those who have surplus funds 
and those who require funds. In addition, they are the 
custodian of the depositor’s money and have an ethical 
obligation to utilize or apply depositors’ funds in a cautious 
manner. The disorders in the banking industry affect all 
areas in the economy because of the interdependencies. 
The significance of corporate governance in banks is, 
therefore, special from the corporate governance point 
of view as compared to any other company.
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 The Reserve Bank of India is continually striving to 
ensure compliance with international standards and best 
practices of corporate governance in the Indian banking 
system. Whether the bank is a state or privately owned, 
governance is critical. In India, it was only in 1998, 
when inefficient management was identified as one of 
the key issues associated with bank performance that 
the corporate governance cropped up in the financial 
sector agenda. To remain in competition and perform 
better, it has become essential for banks to adopt effective 
measures of corporate governance. A few studies which 
focus on corporate governance of banks are Levine 
(2003); Macey and O’Hara (2003); Caprio et al. (2007); 
Adams and Mehran (2005).
 Pathan and Faff (2013) insist that bank’s board 
plays an essential role in achieving effective governance. 
Regulators of banks have placed huge responsibility 
and higher standards of accountability on board of 
directors than other firms. At the time of poor economic 
performance or financial crises regulators may lead 
government to sue directors to recover losses in bank 
failures. The effectiveness of banks board have become 
an important question especially with the newly adopted 
governance rules (Liang, Xu & Jiraporn 2013)
 Regulators of banks have placed further responsibility 
and higher standards of accountability on the board of 
directors than other firms. At the time of poor economic 
performance or financial crises regulators may lead the 
government to sue directors to recover losses from bank 
failures. Thus the study also examines the causal effect 
of board structure on firm performance. Several studies 
attempt to explain the causal effect of board structure 
on firm performance (Adams & Ferreira 2007; Harris 
& Raviv 2008; Hermalin & Weisbach 1998; Raheja 
2005). However majority of the studies exclude banks or 
financial firms from their studies. Thus this study aims 
to fill this knowledge gap by investigating whether the 
boards’ characteristics has an effect on firm’s performance 
in a regulated industry like India’s banking Industry.
 The primary contribution for the study is that it 
undertakes intensive overview of governance in the 
banking sector in particular, corporate governance in 
general. It would therefore contribute to the emerging 
importance and literature on corporate governance in 
India. To the best of our knowledge no study in the 
literature has analysed the impact of board characteristics 
on bank board in Indian context. Secondly, it gives a most 
comprehensive analysis in terms of sample size and time 
framework. The analysis covers 28 listed Indian banks for 
a period of seven years from 2008 to 2014. Thirdly, both 
accounting (ROA, ROE, NII) and market based (Tobin’s Q) 
measures have been used for measures of performance. 
Fourth, the comparison has been made in the econometric 
technique used in these types of studies and then a well-
developed Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
Estimator is used to investigate the dynamic nature of 
performance and governance relationship. The GMM 
estimation technique has been used to control all the 
important sources of endogeneity problem in governance 
variables and other firm characteristics. Fifth, the study 
uses an additional measure of board characteristics 
of board meeting attended which has not been used 
in previous literature. Finally, focusing on the board 
of directors as the supreme organ of the governance 
structure, the study is expected to bring out suggestions 
for improvement of board functioning; and this may 
go a long way to improve board function and bank 
performance of Indian Banks.
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents 
the literature review and hypothesis development. Section 
3 describes the sample, variables, and econometric 
methodology. Section 4 presents analysis and results and 
Section 5 concludes the study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The present study reviews the corporate governance 
practices for the banking sector in India. Previous literature 
shows that the board of directors and their characteristics 
play an important role in the banking sector than in other 
firms (Levine 2003; Macey & Ohara 2003).
 Levine (2003) examines the corporate governance of 
banks. The study states that banks are special because of 
their two special attributes: greater opaqueness than other 
industries and more government regulations. The study 
reviews various government policies that enhance the 
governance of banks. The study concluded that instead 
of relying exclusively on government regulators, public 
policy should seek to enhance private monitoring of banks.
Macey and O’Hara (2003), explain the role that corporate 
governance plays in corporate performance. They argue 
that commercial banks pose unique corporate governance 
problems for managers and regulators, as well as for the 
claimants like investors and depositors. Bank directors 
should expand their scope of fiduciary duties beyond 
shareholders to include creditors also. While making 
decisions directors should take solvency risk explicitly and 
systematically into account, or else face personal liability 
for failure to do so.
 Adams and Mehran (2003) analyzed potential 
differences in the way corporate governance works in 
banks compared to other industries. They find that board 
size, the number of outside directors in the board; the 
number of committees and the frequency of reunion of 
the board are larger for Bank Holding Companies than 
for firms in manufacturing sector. In a subsequent study, 
Adams and Mehran (2005) found that the larger boards 
are accompanied by increased performance, measured by 
Tobin’s Q after controlling the firm size, capital structure, 
and uncertainty, as well as for a set of corporate governance 
variables.
 Kim and Rasiah (2010) used descriptive and regression 
model analysis for the foreign and domestic commercial 
bank data from 1995 to 2005 to investigate the effect of 
corporate governance and bank performance in Malaysia 
for pre and post financial crises. The result indicates a 
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linear relationship between corporate governance and bank 
performance. The result also shows that when capital and 
asset ratios of banks have fulfilled the stipulations, it will 
turn the status of banks in the healthy bank category.
 Ross and Crossan (2012), discuss the extent to which 
corporate governance structures have been a contributory 
factor to the recent banking crisis in either shareholder 
capitalism (UK) or stakeholder capitalism (Germany). They 
made a comparative overview of codes of governance in 
the UK and Germany and also measure the ability of these 
codes to control the actions of banks during the financial 
crisis. The study concluded that corporate governance only 
played a part in the financial crisis, and to make sure history 
does not repeat itself, the whole regulatory environment 
in both countries needs to be strengthened. The findings 
suggested, regardless of the type of governance approach 
based on shareholder capitalism (UK) or stakeholder 
capitalism (Germany), current corporate governance 
structure was not adequate and that a new set of rules is 
needed in both the countries.
 The study by De Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
examined the relationship between board characteristics 
and bank performance and used a sample of 69 large 
commercial banks from six developed countries (Canada, 
France, the UK, Italy, Spain and the US) for the period 
1995-2005. They used a system estimation econometric 
model to solve unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity 
problems. They concluded that the addition of new 
directors is positively linked to a bank’s performance, but 
the relation is inverted U-shaped i.e. when the number of 
directors reaches the upper limit the performance starts 
diminishing. They found that bank performance has a 
significantly positive relation with board meetings and 
supports the hypothesis that the information of inside 
directors in the board are important to perform efficiently. 
 Claessens and Yurtogiu (2012) found that better 
corporate governance benefits firm through greater access 
to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance, and 
more favorable treatment of all stakeholders in emerging 
markets. Empirical evidence shows that the voluntary and 
market corporate governance mechanism have less effect 
when a country’s governance system is weak.
 A study by Liang, Xu and Jiraporn (2013) was 
conducted on a sample of 50 largest banks during the period 
of 2003-2010. They explored comprehensive set of board 
characteristics (size, composition and functioning of the 
board) and analyzed their impact on the bank performance. 
They used the generalized method of moments (GMMs) 
to control the problem of endogeneity and found that 
the board size and proportion of politically-connected 
directors have significantly negative impact on bank 
performance. They concluded that the banks with small 
boards, boards that meet more frequently and boards with 
more independent and less politically connected directors 
are likely to be more efficient. 
 Pathan and Faff (2013) investigated how board 
structure (board size, independence and gender diversity) 
influences bank performance. Their study used a sample 
of 212 large US Bank holding companies over the period 
of 1997-2011. To examine the causal effect of board 
structure on the firm performance they employed System 
GMM Estimation technique to address the problem of 
endogeneity. They also explored the impact of Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX) and financial crises on the relation 
between board structure of banks and their performance. 
Board structure is important especially for small banks 
with low market power and that are resistant to external 
takeover threat. They find that the presence of women 
director or independent director could diminish bank board 
performance.
 Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) empirically 
examined the dynamic nature of internal board governance 
structure. They employed a dynamic panel generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator to overcome 
endogeneity problems and unobserved heterogeneity in 
determinants of board structure and the effect of board 
structure on performance in a panel of 6000 firms from 
1991 to 2003. Their results suggests that it is appropriate 
to consider the dynamic panel GMM estimator for firm 
characteristics and board structure as biasness may arise if 
the potential effects of past governance on current values 
of the determinants are ignored.
 Fidanoski, Mateska and Simeonovski (2014) 
investigated the relationship between the corporate 
governance with the bank’s performance in Republic of 
Macedonia using OLS Regression. Bank performance is 
measured by ROA, ROE, Cost Income Ratio and Capital 
Adequacy Ratio whereas the board structure is described 
in three dimensions: board size, board composition, and 
CEO qualities. The empirical data used as inputs in the 
study for the banks have been observed for the 2008-2011 
period with a total number of 60 observations. The study 
suggested that the appointment of new members on the 
board leads to stronger decision-making process that may 
improve bank’s performance. The presence of female 
members in the supervisory board brings competences 
to improve supervision, which in return enhances bank’s 
efficiency. The study concluded that in order to improve the 
decision-making abilities towards bank’s risk management, 
CEOs that hold his position for a longer period of one four-
year term are more profitable than those with CEOs serving 
their first term as such.
INDIAN STUDIES
Arora, Sharma (2015) investigates the impact of firm 
performance on board characteristics for the manufacturing 
firms in India for the period of 2001- 2010. To measure the 
firm performance following range of measures has been 
used: return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin, 
adjusted Tobin’s q and stock returns. They also use a 
range of alternative measures of board characteristics like 
board size, independence and meetings in the estimation 
process. The study shows that firm performance has 
a negative impact on board characteristics. The study 
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concluded that the governance practices are just added to 
the cost of the company. They found that the larger board, 
outside membership and more meetings are considered 
as expensive affairs in the firm especially in a developing 
country.
 Gunasekar and Dinesh (2014) analysed the relationship 
between board characteristics and firm performance. 
The study compares the board characteristics (board 
independence and board size) on SOE and privately owned 
firm performance in India with a single unified empirical 
framework. The study for measuring the firm performance 
used a market based measure, Tobin’s Q. The study found 
that the board size, percentage of executive directors and 
percentage of independent directors in boards of SOEs 
impact their performance more negatively as compared 
to their private sector counter parts. 
 The above stated literature has raised the importance of 
board structure for the performance of firms. Therefore, the 
board characteristics (proportion of independent directors, 
gender diversity, board size and meetings per year) are 
examined in this study to know their effect on performance 
of banks in India.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Studies by Levine (2003), Macey and Ohara (2003), 
have demonstrated that the board of directors and their 
characteristics play an important role in the banking sector 
than in other firms. The following section presents the 
hypothesis developed for the present paper.
BOARD SIZE AND PERFORMANCE
Board size is crucial in achieving the board effectiveness 
and improved firm performance (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) firms with 
smaller boards of directors are more profitable as they have 
better monitoring role. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argues 
that it is difficult for directors to express their opinions on 
board with large number of directors during the limited 
time available in board meetings. Thus, it is essential 
to identify the appropriate board size. Accordingly, it is 
widely believed that number of director on board depends 
upon the economic environment in which the firm is 
operating. For example, diversified and heavily debt –
financed firms may require large boards (Adams & Mehran 
2005; Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2008). Dalton et al. (1999) 
argue that larger boards improve firm performance by 
facilitating more human capital to advice managers. In case 
of banks, Pathan and Faff (2013) show an inverse relation 
between board size and bank performance. The problems 
of coordination control and flexibility in decision making 
is there in case of large corporate boards (Jensen 1993). 
Thus this study expects a negative association between 
bank board size and bank performance. 
H1: Large board size has a negative relation with bank 
performance
BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Female representation on board has received increased 
attention all over the world. The literature emphasizes that 
gender diversity is an ingredient of the broader concept 
of board diversity. Accurate composition of the board 
is essential to provide diverse perspectives. Boyle and 
Ji (2011) argued that greater female representation on 
boards provide some additional skills and perspectives 
that may not be possible with all-male boards. According 
to Robinson and Dechant (1997), Female Directors are 
more hard working and have superior communication 
skills to improve the decision making ability of the entire 
board. However, Rose (2007) revealed insignificant 
association between number of women directors on the 
board and firm performance. Several studies like Farrell 
and Hersch (2005), Bathula (2008) believe that an increase 
in board diversity leads to better boards and governance 
as diversity facilitates boards with diligent and skilled 
candidates among the wide talent pool available for the 
role of directors. However up to date, in India women 
representation on boards is very small. Although according 
to Companies Act 2013, it is mandatory for all listed 
companies to have a woman director on board. However, 
women are still under represented on boards of banks in 
India. There is an absence of empirical work related to 
relationship between gender diversity in the board room 
and firm performance, especially for banks in India. Based 
on the literature, it is desirable for firms to have gender 
diversity on their boards.
H2: There is a significant positive association between 
board gender diversity and bank performance 
BOARD COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE
The objective of appointing an Independent director in a 
company is to enhance adherence to corporate governance. 
The empirical results are mixed on the relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance. On one hand, 
previous literature (Klein 2002; Rosenstein & Wyatt 1997) 
argued that presence of Independent directors on board 
reduces the conflict of interest, increases the quality of 
monitoring and also improves the financial performance 
of the firm. On the other hand, several studies (Adams & 
Mehran 2005; Harris & Raviv 2008; Raheja 2005) believe 
that the effectiveness of supervision is not maintained by 
simply appointing more independent directors. The special 
nature of banks requires additional directors, particularly 
non-executives, should be endowed with the firm specific 
or specialized knowledge, abilities required monitoring, 
disciplining, and advising managers, thus enabling optimal 
decisions. Thus corporate governance literature offers 
no definite evidence on the effect of appointing outside 
directors (Bhagat & Black 2002; Hermalin & Weisbach 
1998; John & Senbet 1998). 
H3: More Independent directors have a negative 
association with financial performance of Banks.
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BOARD MEETINGS AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Literature has only used the frequency of board meeting as 
variable. But in India the problem lies with the attendance 
of board meeting. The effectiveness of board meetings 
depends upon the number of board members attending 
the meetings. Thus we require 2 variables to represent 
board meetings.
 Internal functioning of the board can be influenced 
by the numerous factors. One of the key factors is the 
frequency of board meetings. Previous studies such as 
De Andres & Vallelado (2008) and Liang et al. (2013) 
have differentiated the board on the bases of frequency 
of meetings of the board as proactive boards and reactive 
boards. Proactive board is the positive signal of the 
frequent meetings of the boards, to have better control 
over managers, which lead to a positive impact on 
performance. However, the reactive board is the negative 
signal towards the frequent meetings of the boards and of 
poor performance. Thus while examining the activity of 
a board, both for and against a positive relation between 
the frequency of meetings and performance is found. 
Moreover, the complexity of the banking business requires 
board members to come together to discuss various 
bank strategies and keep control over managers. Hence, 
the frequent meetings may lead to a positive impact on 
performance. 
H4: There is a significant positive association between the 
frequent board meetings and financial performance.
 The second related and important aspect is to focus 
on the attendance of directors in board meetings. The 
effectiveness of board meetings depends upon the number 
of board members attending the meetings. The increasing 
attendance of the directors in the board meetings lead 
to better decision in times of controversial matters. In 
banking industry, the better attendance is essential to 
exchange ideas and prepare banks strategies for financial 
decisions and loans issues. Thus there should be a linear 
relationship between attendance of board meetings and 
financial performance of banks. 
H5: There is a significant positive association between the 
board meetings attended and financial performance.
 Thus there is a need to examine the board characteristics 
of banks in India to evaluate the relationship among bank 
board characteristics and financial performance of banks. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
DATA
The sample consists of balanced panel of 28 banks in India 
during the period of 2008 to 2014 with 196 bank-year 
observations. The time period has been restricted to 2008 to 
2014 due to non-availability of bank board characteristics 
before 2008 in India. Further the time period of the study 
gives a comprehensive analysis as during this period the 
most important changes took place in terms of governance 
characteristics in Indian firms due to the initiating process 
of development of Companies Act 2013. All the listed 
banks on National Stock Exchange were selected. The 
list of 41 listed banks is available on NSE, but based on 
the availability of board information, market data and 
financial statements for the study period, only 28 banks 
were considered for the Study. Both public and private 
banks are considered for the study. The total assets of our 
bank sample accounted for over 60% of the total banking 
industry assets, equity, loans or deposits, making it a 
representative of the Indian banking industry. 
 The secondary source of data is used to prepare the 
panel data for the Study. Financial information and detailed 
board characteristics were mainly obtained from the 
Bloomberg database and Reserve Bank of India database. 
The information on the director’s characteristic variable 
is hand-collected mostly from the individual banks annual 
reports and banks website. Eviews 6 and Stata 11 softwares 
were used for analysis and the results were presented 
through tables.
 The bank performance is measured by Return on Asset 
(ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Net Interest Income (NII) 
and Tobin’s Q. ROA is calculated as net income before 
interest and tax as a percentage of the book value of the 
assets. ROE is calculated as the net income after tax as a 
percentage of the total equity. NII is calculated as the net 
interest income (i.e. difference between interest income 
and interest expenses). Various previous studies have 
used these variables as a dependent variable in their study 
(Bhagat & Black 2002; Yermack 1996 ). Table 1 shows 
the descriptions of Dependent, Independent and control 
variable considered for the study.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To estimate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the financial performance of banks in India, Panel Data 
Analysis is most suitable. The empirical model aims to 
test the five hypotheses for the association between board 
characteristics and bank performance. To overcome the 
problem of heterogeneity and endogeneity a dynamic 
model has been developed. The model is specified as below
 
(PERF)
i,t
 =  α0+  β1(BSi,t) + β2(Womeni,t) + β3(INDi,t) 
+ β4(MEi,t) + β5(MEAi,t) + β6(BLi,t) + 
β7(BGi,t) + β8(BSIZEi,t) + εi,t    (1) 
 The subscripts i denote individual bank (i = 1, 2, …, 
28) and t denotes the time period (t = 2008, 2009, …, 
2014). The β parameter shows the potential impact of board 
characteristics on bank performance. The α is the estimated 
coefficient for the constant. 
 To estimate the relationship between governance 
and bank performance the study used pooled Ordinary 
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Least Square (OLS) estimation and Generalized Least 
square (GLS) estimation. However, some previous studies 
(De Andres & Vallelado 2008) and Wintoki et al. (2012) 
have examined if unobserved effect is correlated with 
independent variable the results of OLS and GLS are biased 
and inconsistent. Thus, a well-developed panel GMM 
estimator is developed to control the dynamic nature of 
performance and governance relationship.
THE GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS (GMM)
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is a technique 
that aims to choose parameter estimates, such that the 
theoretical model is satisfied as ‘closely’ as possible. 
The estimates are selected to minimize the weighted 
distance between the theoretical and actual values. This 
method requires that the sample correlation between the 
explanatory variables and instruments is close to zero. 
The ordinary least square (OLS) or traditional fixed or 
random- effect estimates is improved in a series of paper 
by Arellano Bond (1991) which was first proposed by 
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988). The estimation 
of GMM involves the use of dynamic effect by adding a 
lagged dependent variable to the explanatory variable. 
The individual effects are included in the model, with the 
Arellano-Bond method using differencing. This approach 
overcomes the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, the 
issue of endogenous board variables and the effects of 
past performance on governance variables. The problem 
of endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is 
correlated with the error term in a regression model. The 
approach helps to construct more efficient estimates for 
dynamic panel data model.
 The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model 
approach has been preferred in the areas of finance and 
economics where problem suggest a dynamic relation 
between dependent and independent variables (Wintoki et al. 
2012). Thus, to estimate the causal effect between corporate 
governance and performance of banks GMM has been used. 
 The dynamic panel GMM estimator is applied to the 
effect of board structure and bank performance and the 
results are also compared to those obtained from OLS 
or traditional fixed effects estimates. De Andres and 
Vallelado (2008) found the results of OLS and fixed effect 
is inconsistent and biased when the unobserved effect is 
correlated with the independent variable.
 The estimation procedure consists of the following 
steps:
1. Specify model
2. Include individual effect in the model by using 
differencing.
3. Specify instruments (often lagged values of all 
variables in the model)
4. Choose a method for adjusting standard errors, to 
overcome heteroskedasticity.
5. Use the Sargan test to determine if the instruments are 
suitable (Test for over identifying restrictions)
 Thus initially, the empirical model estimates the effect 
of board characteristics on the performance of banks:
TABLE 1. Board structure and performance variables
Abbreviation Variable 
Performance
(Dependent Variable)
Description
ROA
 Q
NII
ROE
Return on Assets
Tobin’s Q
Net Interest Income
Return on Equity
Net Income to Average Total Assets
Total Market Value of Firm/Total Asset Value of Firm
Difference between interest income and interest expenses 
Net income/Shareholder’s Equity
Control Variable
BSIZE
BL
BG
YEAR
Bank size for ith bank and time period t 
Banks leverage for ith bank and time period t 
Bank growth rate for ith bank and time period t
Year dummies
Log of total assets
Debt/Equity
Total return for last period - Total Return for current period
Seven individual year dummy variables which equal zero or 
one for each year from 2008 to 2014.
Board Characteristics
(Independent Variable)
BS
Women
IND
ME
MEA
Number of Board Members for ith bank and time 
period t 
Percentage of Female Directors on the board for ith 
bank and time period t 
Proportion of Independent directors for ith bank and 
time period t 
No of Board meetings per year for ith bank and 
time period t 
Percentage of meeting attended by the board of 
directors for ith bank and time period t 
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 yit = yi,t – 1 + βXit + γzit + ni + εit (1)
 Where X, Y, Z represent board structure, performance 
and firm characteristics, respectively, and n represents an 
unobserved firm effect. 
 In the next step the dynamic model Equation 2 is re 
written in first differenced form by eliminating the constant 
term and the individual effect:
 Δyit = Δyi,t – 1 + βΔXit + γΔzit + ni + Δεit (2)
 First difference helps in eliminating the biasness 
arising from time invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
and omitted variable biasness. The approach allows to 
use explanatory variables as endogenous and uses lagged 
value (past value) of all variables as instruments.
 Thus the past/lagged values of board structure, 
performance and controlled variables of specific are 
used as instruments. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), the 
use of historical values of explanatory variables as the 
instrument is an important aspect of the dynamic panel 
estimator. Therefore the instruments will be drawn from 
dependent and explanatory variables i.e., y
t – k
, X
t – k
, z
t – k
. 
There are two assumptions for the criteria to be valid. 
Firstly, there must be some variations in the lagged values 
of the explanatory variable. Secondly, there should be 
a strong correlation between board characteristics and 
historical performance and other variables.
 The next step after first differencing is that the lagged 
variables must be exogenous i.e., the lagged variables 
must be uncorrelated with the error in the performance 
(Wintoki et al. 2012). This can be explained as by using 
lags of performance, no information from the firm’s 
history has an effect on current governance and firm 
characteristics. Thus, beyond the given time period, the 
firm’s history should be exogenous with respect to any 
shocks to the dependent variable in the current or future 
period. Hence, GMM enables to deal with endogeneity 
and unobserved heterogeneity which is associated with 
each firm and correlated with the rest of the explanatory 
variables.
DYNAMIC EMPIRICAL MODEL OF FIRM PERFORMANCE
The study uses the following equation for investigating the 
relation between performance and board structure.
 
 (PERF)
i,t
 = α0 + ϕ (PERF)i,t–k + β1(BSi,t) + 
β2(Womeni,t) + β3(NEDi,t) + β4(MEi,t) 
+ β5(MEAi,t) + β6(BLi,t)+ β7(BGi,t) + 
β8(BSIZEi,t) + εi,t      (3) 
 The subscripts i denote individual bank (i = 1, 2, …, 
28) and t denotes the time period (t = 2008, 2009, …, 
2014). The β parameter shows the potential impact of 
board characteristics on bank performance. The α & ϕ is 
the estimated coefficient for the constant variable and for 
lag of dependent variable respectively. 
 The model is tested on two critical specification tests. 
The first test is the second order serial correlation. Both first 
order [AR (1)] and second order [AR (2)] autocorrelation 
is used. This test enables to check whether enough lags 
have been used to control the dynamics of the empirical 
relationship. The residuals of the first differences [AR (1)] 
may be correlated but there should be no serial correlation 
in the second differences [AR (2)]. This test assures the 
historical value of firm performance beyond those lags is 
strictly exogenous to current performance shocks. Hansen/
Sargan of over-identification of restrictions is the second test 
used for dynamic panel GMM. It enables to test the validity 
of the multiple lags as an instrument. At the end, the Wald 
test for overall significance of the model is also used. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the various 
boards’ structure and characteristics of banks. The table 
shows the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum values of the following variables: Return On 
Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Net Interest Income 
(NII), Board Size (BS), Percentage of Independent Directors 
(IND), frequency of meetings per year (ME), percentage of 
meetings attended (MEA), women on board (women), bank 
total assets in millions (BSIZE), Bank Growth rate (BG) 
and Bank Leverage (BL). By comparing the two financial 
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for the various board characteristics and firm variable
 ROA ROE NII TOBIN_Q BS IND ME MEA Women BSIZE BG BL
 Mean 0.94 14.89 10.49 1.02 11.20 50.39 12.47 87.94 6.91 10.55 19.23 165.77
 Median 0.91 15.56 10.50 1.00 11 50.00 13 89.47 7.69 12.10 17.92 146.06
 Maximum 1.92 29.62 11.83 1.30 18 90.91 20 97.97 27.27 13.38 70.40 577.36
 Minimum -0.43 -25.37 9.11 0.95 7 0 5 58.04 0 1.03 -59.49 15.06
 Std. Dev. 0.42 6.46 0.50 0.07 1.70 19.42 3.23 6.29 6.30 3.91 14.73 105.32
Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196
Return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), Net Interest Income (NII), board size (BS), proportion of Independent directors (IND), number of meetings per year (ME), 
Percentage of meetings attended (MEA), women on board (women), total bank assets in millions (BSIZE), Bank growth rate (BG) and bank leverage (BL)
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performance measures (ROA and ROE), we can say that the 
sample banks are relatively doing better on the Return on 
Equity performance measure. The mean value of Return on 
Equity is 14.89 percent, whereas Return on Asset is 0.94 
indicating that the sample banks are superior in utilizing 
shareholders equity capital. On the bases of standard 
deviation from the mean, Return on Equity shows higher 
standard deviation i.e., 6.46 percent than ROA 0.42 percent. 
The mean of Tobin’s q ratio is greater than one and NII is 
around 11 percent. The mean (median) of board size is 
11.20 (11) with a minimum of 7 and maximum of 15. The 
sample mean board size is comparable to average board 
size of 12 in klein (2002), and Vafeas (1999). The mean 
(median) percentage of non executive director accounts 
for 51% (50%), which is much lower than the average IND 
of 79% in Adams and Mehran (2005). According to Table 
2 the mean (median) number of meetings per year is 12 
(13), which is higher while comparing to average number 
of meeting of 9 meetings in Adams and Mehran (2005). 
The mean (media) women on board are 6.9% (7.6%) for 
the given sample of banks in India.
 To distinguish the impact of governance mechanism 
on types of banks, the sample is further divided into bank 
type (public and private) and on the basis of bank size 
(small and large). Large banks are defined as the banks 
whose total assets are above the 25 percentile of the sample 
bank of that year same as done by Liang et al. (2013). The 
remaining banks were defined as small banks. Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 report the time trends of board size, percentage of 
independent directors, percentage of board meetings held, 
percentage of women director on board of banks form 
2008-2014. Figure 1 shows the trend on the basis of size 
of banks which are further bifurcated into small banks and 
large banks. Panel A reports the mean board size remained 
relatively flat for small banks while it has increased slightly 
for large banks. The average board size is 11 in 2008 and 
11.5 in 2014. Panel B reports the mean percentage of 
independent directors over the time trend. There has been 
a remarkable increase in independent directors in small 
banks from 54% to 60% while in case of large banks it 
has remain relatively flat. Panel C shows the time trend in 
number of board meeting conducted. Both small and large 
banks have shown a swing over the sample period. On 
an average, the number of board meetings has increased 
from 12.25 to 12.88 over the period of the study. Panel D 
shows the trend in the mean percentage of women director 
on bank boards. The percentage of women on board has 
been very small in both types of banks. The small banks 
exhibits the biggest increase in over the same period in 
increase in number of women directors while in case of 
large banks there has been a small decline.
 In India, banking sector has been dominated by 
public sector so a comparison between public and 
private bank was done to see the difference between their 
board characteristics. Figure 2 reports the time trend of 
bank characteristics for type of banks which are further 
bifurcated into public and private sector banks. Panel E 
shows that the mean board size has remained relatively 
flat in public banks except for 2014 while there has been a 
slightly increase for private banks. The average board size 
has increased from 10.8 in 2008 to 11.4 in 2014. Panel F 
reports that the number of women director in public banks 
are very less as compared to private banks in 2008 while 
number has been same for both types of banks in 2014. 
Panel G shows that the average number of meetings over 
the sample period has been a slightly increase from 11 in 
2008 to 12.5 in 2014. There has been a general difference 
in the trend of conducting meeting among public and 
private sector banks over the sample trend period. Panel F 
shows the trend in the mean percentage of the independent 
director among public and private sector banks. There have 
been swings over the sample period for both public and 
private sector banks
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS BY BANK TYPE
FIGURE 1. Indian Bank Board Characteristics trends: 
2008-2014 for large and small banks
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS BY BANK TYPE
FIGURE 2. Indian Bank Board Characteristics trends: 
2008-2014 for public and private banks
  47
RESULTS
In this section, the results of OLS and GLS estimators along 
with GMM estimator are included. The Study contributes 
to the empirical literature by facilitating the advantage of 
considering endogeneity: unobservable heterogeneity and 
simultaneity. 
OLS AND GLS ESTIMATORS
The results of OLS and GLS estimators are described in this 
section. Table 3 presents the result of OLS estimator and 
GLS estimator. This estimator is inconsistent and results are 
biased as it does not consider the unobserved heterogeneity 
and endogeneity (including past performance) of the 
independent variable. The OLS estimator results show that 
the board size is insignificant which is not in conferment 
with what we hypothesized. There is no relation between 
board size and performance. The result also shows that 
there is no statistical significant relation between gender 
diversity and bank performance. The OLS estimator shows 
a positive and significant relation between independence 
of board and bank performance indicating the increase in 
number of independent directors of bank board is directly 
related to the performance of banks. The frequency 
of board meetings is positively significant with the 
performance of banks. The strong positive relationship 
supports the hypothesis that that frequent board meetings 
increases the supervision control over mangers, leading 
to better performance of banks. The OLS results are 
biased because of the presence of correlation among the 
explanatory variables and also due to non-consideration of 
fixed effects. This problem is generally solved by previous 
studies by using GLS estimators. 
 Table 3 also presents the regression results by using GLS 
estimator and is comparable to the OLS regression model. 
The relation between independence and performance 
varies from linear to non linear moving from OLS to GLS 
estimation. The relation among frequency of meetings and 
performance is consistent between OLS and GLS model. The 
results with the GLS model are not statistically significant 
in case of board size, independence and gender diversity. 
De Andres and Vallelado, (2008) stated such results are 
due to inconsistency of estimators arising from the lack of 
strict exogeneity of independent variables. In our case the 
independent variables of the board characteristics are not 
exogenous. Therefore the results of OLS and GLS estimators 
are neither econometrically reliable nor consistent with 
the theoretical postulates of previous studies. Thus, an 
advance econometric technique is required which considers 
the individual characteristics of each bank and potential 
endogeneity of board characteristics simultaneously. The 
GMM estimator with adjusted standard errors considers the 
unobserved heterogeneity and the problem of endogeneity 
of independent variables simultaneously (De Andres & 
Vallelado 2008).
THE GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS 
(GMM) ESTIMATOR
The relationship between corporate governance and 
performance of banks is dynamic and needs powerful 
methodology to estimate the causal effect between them. 
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) helps to 
construct more efficient estimates for dynamic panel data 
model. 
 The study uses the above equation for estimating the 
relation between performance and board characteristics.
 Table 4 presents the results of GMM estimation 
with bank performance as the dependent variable. Each 
performance was first regressed with all board variables 
(board size, independence of board, women on board, 
meetings per year and meetings attendance) and then 
TABLE 3. Regression results for the determinants of the bank board structure
Variables GLS Model OLS
ROA Coefficient (Prob) Coefficient (Prob)
Intercept
BS
IND
Women
ME
MEA
BSIZE
BG
BL
0.183
-0.012
0.003
0.004
0.037
0.013
-0.004
0.004
0.000
0.691
0.635
0.106
0.270
0.007***
0.001***
0.397
0.006***
0.785
0.365
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.044
0.011
-0.003
0.006
-0.001
0.421
0.997
0.044**
0.812
0.000***
0.014**
0.708
0.001***
0.015**
Observations
Wald chi2
Prob
R-sq
196
30.27
0.00
0.204
196
6.93
0.00
0.229
Level of Significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Return on assets (ROA), board size (BS), proportion of outside directors (IND), women on board (Women), number of 
meetings per year (ME), percentage of meetings attended (MEA), total bank assets in millions (BSIZE), bank growth 
rate (BG) and bank leverage (BL)
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adding year dummies in separate regressions. Table 4 
reports the regression results of ROA as performance 
measure and all the other alternative performance measure 
(ROE, NII and Tobin’s Q) are shown in Appendix 1. The 
specification test for the validity of dynamic model shows 
the desirable statistically significant AR (1) and statistically 
insignificant AR (2). The Sargan Test of instrument validity 
is insignificant for all the models which confirm the 
validity and choice of instrument variables. The Wald test 
is significant and quite high leading to all model fit. 
 The results confirm the significant negative relationship 
between board size and ROA. The estimate coefficient on 
BS is -0.042 and statistically significant at 1% level. The 
result is consistent with previous research (De Andres & 
Vallelado 2008; Hermalin & Weisbach 1998; Yermack 
1996). Boards with many directors have to face multiple 
problems related to coordination, communication and 
decision making which effect the functioning of the banks. 
Thus, the result supports the sub hypothesis that. 
LARGE BOARD SIZE HAS A NEGATIVE RELATION 
WITH BANK PERFORMANCE
The number of independent directors on board is negatively 
and statistically significant with performance of board. The 
estimate coefficient of board independence is (-0.003) and 
statistically significant at 1% level. The result supports 
the hypothesis that adding more independent directors 
to the board has a negative impact on the performance of 
the board. The result is consistent with previous studies 
(Bhagat Black 2002; Coles et al. 2008; Pathan 2013). It 
seems that the main aim of independent directors in banks 
is to keep an eye on regulatory compliance. 
 The result shows a positive and significant relationship 
between women on board with performance of bank. The 
estimated coefficient on women is (0.003) and statistically 
significant at 1% level. The result is also consistent with 
the findings of previous studies (Andres 2008; Pathan 
2013). The result supports the hypothesis that there is 
a significant positive association between board gender 
diversity and financial performance. Thus presence of 
women facilitates with improved decision making by their 
superior communication skills and talent.
 The Study observes a positive and statistically 
significant relation between the number of board meetings 
in a year and bank performance. The estimated coefficient 
is (0.018) and significant at 5% level. The result is 
in consistent with the previous studies (De Andres & 
Vallelado 2008; Liang 2013). Thus, the result supports the 
hypothesis that there is a significant positive association 
between the frequent board meetings and performance of 
banks. The increase in frequency of board meetings enables 
top management to become proactive and enhance the 
decision making ability by exchanging ideas frequently. 
 The study also reported a similar significantly positive 
relationship between meetings attended and performance 
of the banks. The estimated coefficient is (0.005) and 
statistically significant at 1% level. The result confirms the 
hypothesis that there is a significant positive association 
between the board meetings attended and performance of 
the banks. The increased attendance of the board members 
TABLE 4. GMM estimation regression results
ROA Coef. p>|t| Coef p>|t|
BS
IND
Women
ME
MEA
BG
BL
BSIZE
ϕ
Y08
Y09
Y10
Y11
Y12
Y13
Y14
Wald
Sargan
AR1
AR2
-0.042
-0.003
0.004
0.018
0.006
0.006
0.000
-0.006
0.701
466.850
23.178
-3.185
0.759
0.006***
0.004***
0.036**
0.014**
0.000***
0.000***
0.005***
0.003***
0.000***
0.000***
0.985
0.001***
0.448
-0.048
0.001
0.002
-0.005
0.007
0.004
0.000
0.055
0.710
-0.780
0.832
0.215
0.214
0.223
0.139
0.091
94.340
14.893
-3.161
0.309
0.049**
0.047**
0.009***
0.068*
0.051**
0.009***
0.093*
0.002***
0.000***
0.466
0.349
0.425
0.433
0.412
0.609
0.743
0.000***
1.000
0.002***
0.758
Level of Significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Return on assets (ROA), board size (BS), proportion of outside directors (IND), women on board (Women), number of meetings 
per year (ME), percentage of meetings attended (MEA), bank growth rate (BG, bank leverage (BL), total bank assets in millions 
(BSIZE), coefficient for lag of dependent variable (ϕ) 
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in the board meetings improves the discussions among top 
management to search for strategic options and discussions, 
which may subsequently enhance the bank performance. 
Coefficient for lag of dependent variable (ϕ) is positively 
significant. The controlling variables Bank growth rate, 
bank size and bank leverage showed a positive significant 
relation. This confirms that individual bank characteristics 
affect the board structure in banks. However none of the 
year dummy is statistically significant, which confirms 
that board characteristics are not affected by any of the 
particular year effect. 
 Further, the analysis has been repeated by using other 
performance variables, Return on Equity (ROE), Net Interest 
Income (NII) and Tobin’s Q. There has been no significant 
difference in the results measured by these performance 
variables as shown in Appendix 1 and the original model. 
Appointment of new directors show a negatively significant 
relation with ROE and Tobin’s Q as in the original model. 
For independence of board there is a positive significant 
relation with NII and Tobin’s Q. However with ROE there 
is a negative significant relation for independence of board 
as in the original model which confirms that efficient 
boards are not affected by the presence of majority of 
independent directors. However, the banks require more 
skilled and knowledgeable executive directors whom 
can be complimented by non-executive director. There is 
significant positive relation between women on board and 
all alternative variables (ROE, Tobins’s Q and NII). This 
implies that women work diligently as directors and are 
considered to be value relevant in board. Further both ROE 
and Tobins’s Q show a positive significant relation with 
Meeting attended during the year. Coefficient for lag of 
dependent variable (ϕ) for the all alternative performance 
variable is also statistically significant as in the original 
model. The model has been estimated by controlling bank 
growth rate, bank size and bank leverage. The statically 
significant result for all the controlling variables shows that 
the institutional settings affect the board characteristics and 
composition in banks boards.
EXTENDED ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK
The banks performance and board characteristics are also 
affected by different regulatory framework requirements 
and institutional characteristics across banks. The study 
also examines the impact of board characteristics (size, 
gender diversity, independence and number of meetings) 
on bank performance (NII) across different banks.
RESULTS FOR LARGE AND SMALL BANKS
In India, the large banks accounts for nearly 70% of the 
total banking assets, leading to heavily skewed. Thus there 
is a need to investigate, whether there is any difference 
for our findings on the impact of board characteristics 
on performance of banks between the large and small 
banks. Further, to address this bank size issue the relation 
between board characteristics and bank performance the 
equations are re-estimated using system GMM for the two 
group’s namely large banks and small banks. The Large 
banks are defined as the banks whose total assets are 
above the 25th percentile of the sample banks that year. 
The remaining banks were defined as small banks. The 
regression results for the groups are reported in Table 
5. The estimated coefficient on Board size (BS), the 
percentage of Independent directors (IND), and percentage 
of meeting attended by board members (MEA) are all 
statistically positively significant for large banks. However 
in case of small banks only the estimated coefficient for 
the percentage of independent director (IND) is statistically 
TABLE 5. GMM estimator result of the board structure for small and large banks
Bank size Small Large
NII
BS
IND
Women
ME
MEA
BG
BL
BSIZE
Cons
ϕ
Wald
Sargan
Ftest
AR1
AR2
Coef.
0.004
0.003
-0.001
-0.009
-0.002
0.001
0.000
0.040
3.677
0.603
220
3.610
0.320
-1.220
1.346
p>|t|
0.890
0.032**
0.635
0.440
0.476
0.280
0.980
0.666
0.005***
0.000***
0***
1.000
0.577
0.223
0.178
Coef
0.010
-0.001
0.000
0.004
0.002
0.003
0.000
0.328
1.796
0.437
5121
8.326
1.360
-1.489
-0.820
p>|t|
0.059*
0.011**
0.258
0.258
0.001***
0.000***
0.042**
0.001***
0.000***
0.000***
0
0.973
0.248
0.136
0.412
Level of Significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Net Interest Income (NII), board size (BS), proportion of outside directors (NED), women on board (Women), number 
of meetings per year (ME), percentage of meetings attended (MEA), bank growth rate (BG), bank leverage (BL), total 
bank assets in millions (BSIZE), coefficient for lag of dependent variable (ϕ) 
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significant. Therefore, these results suggest that large 
banks have more impact of board characteristics on bank 
performance as compared to small banks. The first major 
reason may be because of competitive advantage of large 
banks on small banks which allows them to focus on good 
governance. The other reason is the intensive monitoring 
by regulators which force them to follow good governance 
in banks. 
RESULT OF BANKS WITH HIGH AND LOW 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIOS
The study also examines the impact of board characteristics 
on bank performance across banks on the basis of different 
capital adequacy ratios. The enforcement of capital 
adequacy requirement has a direct impact of regulatory 
pressure experienced by banks. Thus, banks with different 
capital adequacy ratio behave differently as they face 
different pressure for meeting the capital requirements (Q 
Liang 2013). The issue of different capital adequacy ratio 
is addressed by re-estimating Eq- (1) using two step GMM 
estimator for two groups: Low Cap and High Cap. The 
high Cap is defined as the banks whose capital adequacy 
ratio is above the median level of the sample banks. Those 
banks whose capital adequacy ratio is less than the median 
of the sample banks are defined as the Low Cap. Table 
6 reports the sub-sample regression results. The result 
shows that for low capitalized banks the percentage of 
Independent Directors (IND), presence of women (women) 
and percentage of meeting attended by board members 
(MEA) is statistically significant at 5% and 10% level. The 
percentage of Independent directors (IND) is positively 
significant at 10% level for well capitalized banks.
 The extended analysis shows that banks with different 
size characteristics have different impact of board 
characteristics on performance of banks. The bank board’s 
plays a stronger role in large banks and banks with low 
capital adequacy ratios. The result confirms that board 
governance depends upon the bank characteristic also 
which is consistent with the previous research (Coles et 
al. 2008; Liang 2013).
CONCLUSION
The corporate governance mechanism plays an important 
role in banks due to its complex nature. The drastic 
measures to nurse the banks to sound health are rarely 
talked about and preference is given to the new financial 
regulations. However, regulations entail fresh problems 
for the corporate governance of banks. The painfully slow 
decision making by the boards is slowly taking a toll on 
the health of the banks in India. Banks boards are vital for 
bank governance monitoring managers or advising them 
in the design and implementation of strategies (De Andres 
& Vallelado 2008). The study examines the relationship 
between board characteristics (size, composition, gender 
diversity and board meetings) and performance of banks 
in India. Panel data of listed banks in India has been used 
from 2008 to 2014. 
 The study confirms that two step system GMM 
approach control the problem of unobserved heterogeneity 
and endogeneity as compared to the OLS and GLS approach. 
The results suggest that banks with small boards, boards 
with female members, and boards that meet more 
frequently tend to be more efficient and subsequently 
have a positive impact on performance of banks. Efficient 
boards are not affected by the presence of majority of 
independent directors. However, the banks require more 
skilled and knowledgeable executive directors whom can 
be complimented by non-executive director. Independent 
directors should enable discussions and debate and must 
TABLE 6. Determinants of the board structure for low and high capital adequacy
Cap  Low High
NII
BS
NED
Women
ME
MEA
BG
BL
BSIZE
Cons
ϕ
Wald
Sargan
AR1
AR2
Coef.
-0.002
-0.001
-0.004
0.015
-0.002
0.003
0.000
0.005
1.196
0.88
5521
4.548
-2.211
0.924
p>|t|
0.832
0.056*
0.078*
0.164
0.041**
0.000***
0.384
0.003***
0.084*
0.000***
0.000***
1.000
0.027**
0.355
Coef
-0.253
0.009
0.001
0.203
-0.004
0.003
0.000
0.002
-0.213
1.06
12187
2.149
-1.118
1.053
p>|t|
0.244
0.024**
0.653
0.236
0.459
0.085*
0.369
0.509
0.940
0.000***
0.000***
1.000
0.264
0.292
Level of Significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Net Interest Income (NII), board size (BS), proportion of outside directors (NED), women on board (Women), number of meetings 
per year (ME), percentage of meetings attended (MEA), bank growth rate (BG), bank leverage (BL), total bank assets in millions 
(BSIZE), coefficient for lag of dependent variable (ϕ)
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facilitate independent judgment to the board. Thus such 
independent directors should be selected whose knowledge 
complements the ability of executive directors and not for 
merely conforming to regulatory requirements.
 The analysis suggests that there is a need to diversify 
the board by employing more women director in Indian 
Banking sector. Gender Diversity Plan plays an important 
role in effective decision making in banks. At the same 
time, it is essential to have right person at the right job 
based on the specialization, qualification and experience 
requirements. It is essential to populate bank board 
with experienced and competent women who could 
meaningfully contribute to board performance 
 The study indicates that there should be an increase 
in the frequency of board meetings to make strategic 
board decisions or solve the problems of the firm, 
which subsequently improve the performance. Further 
it is emphasized that board meeting attendance, active 
participation, expertise required should be given high 
priority by the policy makers while making corporate 
governance policies.
 The study also examines the relationship between 
bank boards and performance of board with different bank 
characteristics. The empirical results suggest that large 
banks and banks with high capital adequacy ratio have 
well governed board which is positively related to their 
performance. 
 To conclude, the findings suggest that banks with 
effective corporate governance mechanisms perform 
better as compared to the others. Bringing about effective 
adherence to the above parameters in the banking industry 
is the paramount responsibility of the banks’ boards of 
directors and top management. It can be safely concluded 
that in the present form of board structure, with majority 
of part time and doubtful nominee directors and the 
irregular board meetings and the presence of absentee 
directors, the required justice towards effective governance 
is only possible if more emphasis is given towards 
effective governance practices. The board must accept 
the responsibility of any misgovernance if any and will 
have fixed accountability and absolute responsibility. The 
penal provisions concerning directors as enshrined in the 
Companies Act, 2013 may also be enforced. 
 The study suggests that it is essential to have good 
governance of banks in India as the health of banks in India 
is of concern due to alarming rise in frauds calling for an 
overhaul of the governance structure.
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APPENDIX 1. GMM estimation regression results for the determinants of the bank board structure
 ROE NII Tobin’s Q
 Coef. p>|t| Coef p>|t| Coef. p>|t| Coef p>|t| Coef. p>|t| Coef p>|t|
BS -0.955 0.023** 0.696 0.458 0.005 0.011** -0.002 0.744 -0.004 0.004*** -0.014 0.078
IND -0.041 0.143 -0.069 0.186 0.000 0.245 0.000 0.867 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.193
Women 0.004 0.871 0.092 0.049** 0.000 0.881 0.001 0.411 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.065
ME -0.146 0.340 -0.042 0.822 0.003 0.077* -0.001 0.711 -0.004 0.000*** 0.000 0.936
MEA 0.131 0.000*** 0.082 0.126 -0.001 0.000*** -0.001 0.107 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.837
BG 0.121 0.000*** 0.126 0.000*** 0.003 0.000*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.102
BL 0.009 0.000*** 0.007 0.226 0.000 0.386 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.055** 0.000 0.601
BSIZE -0.124 0.000*** -3.758 0.039** 0.003 0.000*** -0.033 0.273 0.003 0.000*** 0.007 0.206
ϕ 0.695 0.000*** 0.541 0.000*** 0.876 0.000*** 0.521 0.000*** -0.13 0.000*** -0.48 0.000***
Y08   26.752 0.281   5.521 0.000***   1.014 0.000***
Y09   -30.323 0.211   -0.515 0.140   0.275 0.010
Y10   10.928 0.260   -0.103 0.170   0.221 0.003***
Y11   9.850 0.308   -0.023 0.751   0.239 0.002***
Y12   11.113 0.244   -0.006 0.929   0.220 0.004***
Y13   9.853 0.300   0.015 0.826   0.210 0.006***
Y14   7.663 0.441   0.046 0.551   0.218 0.007***
Wald 3427.120 0.000*** 7723.960 0.000***   27360.700 0.000*** 4812.250 0.000*** 8174.040 0.000***
Sargan 25.301 0.966 11.248 1.000 20.106 0.996 14.020 1.000 19.587 0.997 10.828 1.000
AR1 -1.939 0.053 -2.073 0.038 -2.336 0.020 -2.685 0.007*** 1.217 0.224 0.664 0.506
AR2 0.302 0.763 -0.195 0.845 1.718 0.086 1.235 0.217 -1.567 0.117  0.345  0.729
Level of Significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Return on equity (ROE), Net Interest Income (NII), board size (BS), proportion of outside directors (IND), women on board (Women), number of meetings per year (ME), 
percentage of meetings attended (MEA), bank growth rate (BG), bank leverage (BL), total bank assets in millions (BSIZE), coefficient for lag of dependent variable (ϕ)  

